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I. INTRODUCTION
The concern over protection of Intellectual Property has been an issue for
over 500 years. The basis behind the issue is to promote innovation by
restricting competition, thus, guaranteeing the return of investments into
research and development. This represents a very delicate balance between the
corporations and individuals discovering these new ideas and the people that
might benefit from them. The inventor is rewarded for his innovation with an
exclusive right to sell the product and collect profits. This issue becomes
increasingly sensitive when dealing with rights to patents of medicines held by
corporations, but needed by millions of people with serious diseases. The cost
of development of the drugs is high, but the demand is even higher, although the
most needy of the people are typically not the ones that can afford them.
The United States, along with the other developed countries of the world,
stands for strict protection of intellectual property rights. With the creation of
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the World Trade Organization, developing countries facing health crises, such
as HIV/AIDS, were given a forum to express their concerns and needs for
cheaper alternatives to the costly drugs produced by mostly American
corporations. Although agreements were signed that provided options for these
developing nations, trade pressure and legal threats by the United States and
other developed nations prevented these options from being fully utilized.
Then came September 11 th and the anthrax outbreaks, and suddenly it
seemed as though the United States was singing a different tune. The United
States warned that it would use the same options against Cipro manufacturer,
Bayer AG, that it had prevented developing and least-developed countries from
relying on to receive cheap AIDS drugs. The rest of the world was in an uproar
over the United States' double standard and the full repercussions from this act
have yet to be fully realized.
11. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)
AND THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
The Paris Convention, established in 1883, was the first important
international treaty offering the protection of patents and other intellectual
property.' It was based upon a national treatment principle in which the patent
owner was only granted rights in the patent granting country.' As a result, an
inventor who wanted to protect his invention in multiple countries had to file for
patent protection in each country which he wanted protection.3 The main
weakness of the Convention was that it did not require standardized patent laws
among the participating countries and it offered no enforcement remedies in
cases of infringement.4
Although the Paris Convention did go through several revisions, laws
protecting intellectual property rights remained the same for nearly one hundred
years. With the advent of many new technologies in the later parts of the
twentieth century, public policy demanded greater intellectual property rights.5
The Uruguay Round, which represented seven and a half years of negotiations
ending in 1994, is considered the largest series of trade negotiations that have
1. John A. Harrelson, IV. Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIVIAIDS Crisis: Finding
the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 175, 178
(2001).
2. Id. Belgium, Brazil, France, Ecuador, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador,
Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom approved the Convention in 1884 and the United
States ratified it in 1887. See id., infra note 24.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 179.
5. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Comment, Coining of Age with TRIPS: A Comment on J.H.
Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?,
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 179 (2001).
ever occurred.6 The first round of the negotiations occurred at a ministerial
meeting of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members in
Punta del Este, Uruguay.7 The importance of intellectual property rights to the
United States' economy was just then being fully realized and the dominant
countries were in agreement that more protection was better and that changes
would always come in the direction of the intellectual property rights.8
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations culminated with the
signing of the Marrakesh Agreement 9 in April 1994.0 The Agreement
established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on January 1, 1995, it
took effect." One of the agreements, signed as part of the Marrakesh
Agreement, was the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). 2 The 1995 agreement globalized trade rules, including setting up
universal intellectual property rights. 3 The TRIPs agreement is considered the
most comprehensive and influential agreement on international intellectual
property rights and it establishes the minimum standards on copyrights and
related rights, including computer programs and databases, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuits, and
trade secrets. 14  Every WTO member or country wishing to join the
Organization was required to set up patent offices and legislate patent laws,
protect copyrights, and fight piracy. 5 Article 8(1) of TRIPs stated that members
could adopt measures necessary to public health, provided that such measures
were consistent with the other articles of the agreement. 6 The treaty allowed
that compulsory licenses be granted to countries, which then permitted the
making, using, or selling of a design against the patent owner's wishes. 7 Broad
6. Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/fact5 e.htm (last visited July 13, 2002). The Uruguay
Round is a title used to encompass almost eight years of negotiations that occurred in Punta del Este,
Montreal, Geneva, Brussels, Washington, Tokyo and, Marrakesh.
7. Id.
8. Dreyfuss, supra note 5.
9. WTO: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Trade Compliance
Center, available at http://199.88.185.106/tcc/data/commerce-html/TCC_2/WTOMarrakesh-Agreement
.html (last visited June 27, 2002).
10. Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
13. Carlyn Kolker, Doing the Doha Shuffle - At a WTO Meeting, Nations Agreed to Break
Pharmaceutical Patents During Emergencies. Or did They?, THE AM. LAW., Feb. 2002.
14. Carlos M. Correa, Life after the Agreement, Bus. LINE, Mar. 11, 2002.
15. Kolker, supra note 13.
16. See TRIPs, supra note 13, at art. 8(1).
17. Kolker, supra note 13.
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discretion was permitted by the agreement for determining when compulsory
licenses would be afforded; it was up to the individual country to determine
what situation required a compulsory license. 18
The agreement created new conflicts within developing countries because
the protection of intellectual property rights was not a part of the culture of
many countries. 9 One hundred seventeen nations signed the TRIPs agreement
allowing intellectual property rights to be enforced by trade sanctions, despite
this lack of tradition.2" Although they had reservations about strengthening their
intellectual property rights, many developing countries signed the TRIPs
agreement because they were concerned about their own economic growth and
participation in the WTO was essential for them to accomplish this.2'
The TRIPs agreement took effect January 1, 1995, but under the
agreement, WTO members had a transition period in which to comply with the
obligations required by the agreement. 22 Developed countries had until January
1, 1996 to comply, whereas developing countries had until January 1, 2000, and
the least-developed countries had until January 1, 2006 to come into full
compliance. 23 The goal of the agreement was the development of a framework
for insuring the requirement of intellectual property protection was met, while
allowing those countries facing a national health crisis to be able to provide
adequate and cost effective treatments and medicines to combat the
emergency.
24
The United States was reluctant to sign the agreement as it was against
compulsory licensing, but did eventually sign.25 Many countries already had
compulsory licensing laws, but were reluctant to use them for fear of upsetting
the intellectual property community.26  The United States pharmaceutical
industry lobbied against the TRIPs agreement, relying on the "slippery slope"
argument, a legal fiction, believing that once one country was awarded a
compulsory license, then all developing or least-developed countries would
18. Id.
19. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 176.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Committee Report, Scope of the Committee: Intellectual Property as They Relate to
International Trade Agreements such as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), 2000 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. REP. 263.
23. ld.
24. Markus Nolff, Compulsory Patent Licensing in View of the WTO Ministerial Conference
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 133, 137
(2002).
25. Kolker, supra note 13.
26. Id.
request licensing.27 There are two main responses to this argument: first, that
the HIV/AIDS crisis is at epidemic proportions with millions dying from the
disease and its complications; and second, that the pharmaceutical industry
lobbied intensely to prevent the TRIPs agreement from incorporating the rules
on compulsory licensing and lost the fight; the law was approved and actions
are legal.28
The result of the agreement is that compulsory licenses may be granted to
countries to protect public health so long as the measures adopted are necessary
to protect public health and are consistent with the provision of TRIPs.29 The
first provision, "necessary to protect public health," must be given effect before
any adopted measures can be held to be consistent with the provisions of
TRIPs.30 Consistent with the provisions of TRIPs" means consistent with all of
the other applicable provisions of the Agreement; anything that affects
availability, maintenance, and revocation or forfeiture of patents must be in
agreement with the other relevant TRIPS articles.3 Exceptions to the exclusive
rights of a patent holder without authorization by the owner must be in
agreement with TRIPs articles 30 and 31.32 A basis for a potential infringement
cannot be public health, if it merely has an incidental effect on public health, for
the concern is to prevent anti-competitive behavior and abuse of patent rights.33
There must be a balance between the measure taken, namely exclusion of
patent protection, and public health. The AIDS/HIV crisis was the perfect,
albeit most controversial, case for the restriction of patent protection, especially
the anti-retroviral AIDS drugs. 34 The concern for these drugs is that the regimen
must be followed closely, eating food and drinking water at the correct times,
and taking the drugs in the correct order and at the right times. 35 Refusing to do
so could result in the generation of more resistant strands of the virus, which
creates a serious problem in underdeveloped countries where citizens lack the
proper amounts of food and water.36 Some people even feel that it may be more
27. Frederick M. Abbott, Discontinuities in the Intellectual Property Regime: The TRIPS - Legality
of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001).
28. Id.
29. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 8(1).
30. Nolff, supra note 24, at 136.
31. Id.
32. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 30, 31. Comparison of Article 30 of the TRIPs agreement to
Article XX of the GAT1 Agreement suggest that measures taken under the TRIPs agreement using the public
health theory cannot arbitrarily or unjustly discriminate against countries that have the same conditions or are
a "disguised restriction on international trade." See Nolff, supra note 24, at 136.
33. Nolff, supra note 24, at 137.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 138.
36. Id.
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cost effective to improve sanitary conditions, basic public health care, and
raising public and government awareness.
37
One main weakness in the TRIPs agreement is an absence of adequate
enforcement remedies in developing countries.38 Most likely, the court used to
resolve a dispute will be in a developed country, but the country in which the
infringement took place would be a less developed country. 39 "Choice of law"
rules in this area are underdeveloped themselves; jurisdictional issues may result
in judgments that do not protect anyone's interests.4n Countries that only have
intellectual property laws because of their joining the WTO do not have a
history of analysis of the law to allow the developed country to understand how
its laws are intended to apply.4' Courts may even be inclined to harmonize the
law between the developed and less developed countries, leading the court to
apply precedents of the developed country to the less developed country. 2
I. PATENT BREAKING AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
According to Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement, compulsory licensing is
the "use of subject matter without the authorization of the right holder. 43
Article 31 allows WTO members to use these patents, including use by
governments or third parties authorized by a government. Subsection (b)
mentions two uses: (i) "national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency;" and (ii) "public non-commercial use."'  Public non-commercial use
has been implicitly described as use by a government contractor, by or for the
government, and is referred to as the "non-commercial use exception."45 This
exception is not one used for compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.
Each WTO member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which to grant them; the country must
still meet the general and specific requirements applicable for granting of a
37. Id.; See Treatment Action Campaign and Others v. Minister of Health and Others, 2001 SACLR
LEXIS 95 (2001). The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, concluded that HIV was not the primary
cause of AIDS and determined that the distribution of Nevirapine, a drug given to HIV infected pregnant
women to prevent the passing of the virus to their child, was not necessary. In the case, the High Court of
South Africa ordered the government to provide the drug to the HIV-positive mothers, which was being
donated to South Africa free of charge by the manufacturer.
38. Dreyfuss, supra note 5.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See TRIPs, supra note 12, at art. 31.
44. Id.
45. Nolff, supra note 24, at 140.
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compulsory license.46 Subsection (b) of Article 31 requires that compulsory
licensing can only be granted once "efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time."47 This requirement can be waived in times
of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. If the
measure is needed in times necessary to public health, but not in an extreme
emergency, then there must have need efforts to come to reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable amount of time.48
Although the term "compulsory license" is not used in the TRIPs
agreement, Article 31 of the agreement, when read in conjunction with Article
2(1) and Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention, is understood to mean that WTO
members may grant compulsory licenses. 49 The provision created by the Paris
Convention states that such measures should be taken to "prevent abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent. .. "5 Governments, including the United States, have interpreted this
requirement liberally to allow the authorizing and granting of compulsory
licenses in a wide variety of contexts.5'
One of the arguments by developing countries against compulsory
licensing is that the proceedings to be awarded a license are very costly and
protracted, imposing substantial barriers that many countries seek to avoid.
Even under administratively streamlined procedures, compulsory licenses are
subject to pharmaceutical company opposition and can lead to trade pressure
from the United States; these serve to deter humanitarian programs, which act
merely to serve public health needs in distant countries.53 Also, imposing fees
for compulsory licenses on countries that do not even have patent laws means
that a pharmaceutical company that does not have a patent in a certain country
is going to benefit from its use.54
There are arguments for compulsory licenses that favor developing
countries. The argument says that sales of the drugs will increase, offsetting the
lower pricing of the drugs, so long as a reasonable fee is granted and
46. Id.
47. Id.; See TRIPs art. 31 (b).
48. Id. at 142.
49. Abott, supra note 27, at 74.
50. Id. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1967, article 5(A)(2).
51. Id.
52. Pan-Africa; U.S. Post-Doha Conditions Can Kill, AFRICANEWS, Mar. 4,2002 [hereinafter Pan-
Africa].
53. Id.
54. Id.
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pharmaceutical manufacturers will not be significantly harmed.55 Developing
countries only account for ten percent of pharmaceutical profits internationally,
and Africa accounts for only 1.6 percent.5 6 Therefore, compulsory licensing
could result in the promotion of additional sales without impacting the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to make profits to support research and
development.57
One alternative to compulsory licensing is parallel importing. With
parallel importing, a country can search the global market for the best deal on
a patented product, as frequently, a drug manufacturer will sell a product at a
drastically different price depending on location.58 A distributor in a higher
priced location can obtain drugs from a country with lower prices and then
compete with the manufacturer in the higher priced market.59 By parallel
importing, a country can use free market forces to obtain the best price, thus,
preventing the need for domestic manufacturing capabilities, currently a TRIPs
requirement. 60
The mere threat of the generic production of patented drugs is often all that
is needed to achieve discounted prices. Developed countries use compulsory
licensing laws, which are complex and rarely used, as bargaining power for
national governments against the drug producers. 6' Developing countries can
also use generic manufacturers as a negotiating tactic to reduce the price of
brand-name drugs.6" Also, developing countries have contracted with
pharmaceutical companies to build their own domestic production facilities to
achieve technology transfer and increase their own technical capacity. 63
IV. COUNTRIES RESPOND TO TRIPS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
Tens of millions of Africans have HIV/AIDS, but only 10,000 to 15,000
can afford medicines at their full price, even when treatment is partially
subsidized by private medical plans.' On June 12, 2001, Kenya passed a law
making it only the second country in Africa to legalize generic versions of
patented drugs against HIV/AIDS, just after President Moi declared the disease
a national disaster.65 Parliament passed the Industrial Property Bill of 2001,
55. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 191.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., at 192.
59. Id.
60. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 192.
61. Michael A. Gollin, Practice Focus, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at 31.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Pan-Africa, supra note 52.
65. Kenya; Nairobi can manufacture, import HIV/Aids drugs, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001.
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allowing both parallel importing and production of generic anti-retroviral drugs;
Kenya is a WTO member and this created much discord with the Organization.66
The Public Health Administer said that the anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs needed
by patients could not be imported and distributed free of charge due to the
extremely high prices.67 The purpose of the Bill was to replace a previous bill,
and to allow Kenya to comply with the TRIPs agreement.6' Kenya is a member
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property and a member
of the WTO, and according to the Kenya government, the new bill fully
addressed the requirements under the agreement.69
South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of
1997, which permitted the government power to override patents. 70 Thirty-nine
drug companies filed a lawsuit against the government claiming that the new
law was unconstitutional.7 In the litigation against the South African
government, the pharmaceutical industry argued that the legislation authorizing
the Health Minister to allow parallel importation of generic drugs was too
broadly drafted and would allow the Minister to take action beyond that of
parallel importation.72 To succeed at such a claim, the pharmaceutical industry
would have to persuade the South African courts that the TRIPs agreement
directly affects South African law, essentially saying that the industry can rely
on the terms of the TRIPs agreement as the legislation in the national courts. 7 3
The European Court of Justice previously ruled that TRIPs did not directly
affect the law of the European Union and the United States Congress expressly
precluded it from having a direct effect on the law of the United States. 74 The
South African constitution had undergone several recent revisions that have
affected the way that international treaties influence the national law.75 South
African Parliament approved the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1995 and did
not stipulate specifically that the agreements would have direct effect.76 The
lawsuit was settled when all thirty-nine drug manufacturers agreed to sell the
drugs at significantly reduced prices.77
South African and Brazilian officials met to discuss the purchase of generic
ARV drugs by South Africa from Brazil at a price more than fifty percentless
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Kevin Gopal, Tectonic Shift, PHARM. EXEC., Apr. 1, 2001 [hereinafter Tectonic Shift].
71. Id.
72. Abbott, supra note 27, at 82.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Gollin, supra note 61.
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than the brand name equivalent. 78  The South African government
acknowledged that it might be infringing on patent rights, but it felt that the
patent holder's rights should not outweigh the people's access to life saving
medicines; the government felt that this was inline with the governmental and
international public policy.7 9 The medicines imported from Brazil have patents
in South Africa, but the government felt that there is a constitutional right to life
and dignity and that providing these drugs to its citizens falls within this right.8°
The country's concern is that since the drug companies hold monopolies on the
drugs, the prices are too high.8' In response to this, the Medicine Control
Council of South Africa immediately approved the use of these generics for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS.82
In the late 1990's, Brazil had a problem providing government subsidized
access to affordable AIDS drugs and the government responded by passing laws
authorizing the domestic production of generic versions of the American
drugs.83 United States trade representatives stated, "the United States would use
its strength and international laws to modify the situation. ' 84 The United States
approves the use of compulsory licensing in impoverished countries such as
Senegal and Uganda, but in situations such as Brazil, which is considered a
middle-income country, the United States believes that Brazil has an adequate
gross domestic product and industrial support to afford the brand-name
pharmaceuticals.85
In 1996, Brazil passed legislation that guaranteed that all AIDS patients
would receive state-of-the-art treatment, provided for by the government. 86 In
1994, the World Bank estimated that by the year 2000, there would be 1.2
million people affected with AIDS; there were only 530,000.87 Brazil's use of
generic versions of HIV/AIDS drugs, coupled with a national program of
education on the disease, directly contributed to this.88
A second law passed in 1996 in Brazil declared that any product
commercialized before May 14, 1997, would remain unpatented in the country,
78. South Africa: Cosatu Statement on the Importation of Generic Antiretrovirals From Brazil,
AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 29, 2002.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Mike Godwin, Prescription Panic: How the Anthrax Scare Challenged Drug Patents, REASON
FOUND., Feb. 1,2002.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Success Story, PHARM. EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1, 2001 [hereinafter Success Story].
87. Id.
88. Id.
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of which most of the first generation anti-retroviral drugs lie.89 The prices of the
brand-name drugs with Brazilian equivalents have dropped almost eighty
percent, whereas drugs without Brazilian generic equivalents have only dropped
nine percent.9° In 2000, the Brazilian government spent 444 million dollars on
AIDS drugs for its citizens, but saved 422 million dollars between 1997-1999
because of the decline of hospitalizations resulting from AIDS-related
illnesses.9'
Brazil has even announced that it would be spending considerably more
money on research into an AIDS vaccine than it has ever before and plans to
work with the nations of Africa to accomplish this.92 After receiving
international acclaim for its anti-AIDS/HIV programs, Brazil's new victories
come from its contentions that drug patents can be waived in cases of public
health emergencies.93 In Brazil, it is the government institutes that conduct all
the research into the AIDS/HIV programs.9 4 The Far-Manguinhos Institute
produces seven of the fifteen medicines now used in the anti-retroviral cocktail
offered in Brazil, which has led to many new innovations, and three other drugs
are currently being developed. 95 Brazil's stand is that if the molecules are found
to be effective against resistant viruses, the patent will be public and drug
industries of any country would be free to produce them.96 The institute's
situation puts itself in a unique bargaining position for the reduction in price of
pharmaceuticals for Brazilian law provides for the granting of compulsory
licenses of generic versions of drugs in cases of public health emergencies. 97
According to the WTO and the TRIPs agreement, compulsory licenses are only
permitted in countries that have the production ability, and the Far-Manguinhos
Institute provides Brazil with this ability.98 The Health Minister of Brazil
threatened to ignore several patents and this resulted in a forty to seventy
percent reduction in price of two of the anti-AIDS drugs; a third is a new
target.99
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Success Story, supra note 86.
92. Mario Osava, 2001-2002: Brazil's Successful Anti-AIDS Efforts Set to Expand, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Dec. 26, 2001.
93. id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Ninety-five percent of the 16,500,800 patents granted in the United States between 1977 and
1996 were awarded to only ten different industrialized countries, while during this period, developing
countries only accounted for two percent of the patents. Correa, supra note 14.
97. Osava, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. Id. Brazil also provides education to other countries on how to produce their own versions of
the drugs. Angola now has a production facility that was partly funded by Brazil. Brazil is also intensifying
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The government now plans on concentrating on the areas that are
especially impoverished, like the north and northeast sections of the country.'0 0
Of the nearly 600,000 Brazilians infected with HIV/AIDS, most of them are not
even aware that they have contracted the virus.'0 ' Brazil recognizes the
importance of early detection and plans on continuing to produce the cheap
generic versions of the ARV combinations of drugs free of charge to its citizens,
a cost that does not overstress the national budget.' °2
In June 2001, China completed negotiations with the United States for its
accession into the WTO, which would grant China permanent normal trade
relation status.'03 China will be expected to continually comply with its WTO
obligations and this will be monitored by United States trade representatives."
China is considered a priority foreign country, since it does not maintain proper
intellectual property protection, and could have sanctions imposed against it for
failing to meet specific standards, of specific importance is compliance with the
TRIPs agreement." 5 Before 1985, China awarded no patent protection, as the
government awarded inventors of "useful" inventions with a certificate and a
cash award; China then became the owner. 10 6 With the threat of added trade
duties on all Chinese imports, China agreed to improve its system of protecting
intellectual property, passing laws that were approved on August 25, 2000, and
effective on July 1, 2001.1°7
China still has changes that it needs to make to come into full compliance
with TRIPs. Currently, China does not permit patents on inventions that are
prohibited by its country's laws. 08 Additionally, China needs to amend its laws
to include the condition that compulsory licenses will be predominately for the
domestic market and that adequate remuneration will be provided to the patent
cooperation with China and India, two countries that do not recognize patents and produce generic medicines
and chemical substances at low costs. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Osava, supra note 92.
103. Thomas T. Moga, China Changes Patent Law to Comply with TRIPS, NAT'L L. J. (2001).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. In 1993, consistent with article 27(1) of the TRIPs agreement, China agreed to the protection
of patenting of chemical and pharmaceutical products, as well as food, beverages, and flavorings. The
amendments also extended the period of protection from 15 to 20 years, complying with article 33 of TRIPs.
They provided for offering for sale as an exclusive right of the patent holder, hence complying with Article
28 of the TRIPs agreement. Also amended was the section of their law that limited the situations where
compulsory licenses could be granted, bringing it into compliance with Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement.
China also amended its law to provide for injunctive relief against infringement and shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant to prove that an infringement did not occur, complying with article 34(1) of TRIPs. Id.;
See generally TRIPs, supra note 12.
108. Moga, supra note 103. This expressly violates article 27(2) of TRIPs.
holder in the case a compulsory license is issued. °9 Article 41(1) of TRIPs
requires a system of enforcement and remedies in the case of an infringement
of a patent, and to conform to these requirements, China must increase criminal
penalties and reduce the threshold for minimum damages."0 Considering that
China's patent laws are less than twenty years old, the country has shown
commitment to compliance with the TRIPs agreement and the desire to be a
responsible member of the WTO. "'
India, through its Indian Patent Act of 1970, abolished all product patents
and only recognizes process patents for pharmaceutical purposes."12 Indian
manufacturers have an advantage because their manufacturing costs are forty-
five percent lower than those in the United States, and the result is that sixty
percent of the generics sold in the United States are imports.' Additionally,
in India, the government has control over maximum pricing of the drugs."4
The United Kingdom, Canada and European Union members all have
existing well-developed national patent laws giving maximum protection to
their governments. 1 5 The TRIPs provisions are not as far reaching as the
existing laws in these developed countries." 6 British law is governed by the
Patent Act of 1977, which provides for United Kingdom government exemption
from the exclusive rights held by patent owners and thus, need not apply for
compulsory licenses. ' A patent holder could have its patent invalidated by the
Crown.'18 The United Kingdom provides tax incentives to companies
researching medicines and vaccines for diseases of poverty that could total fifty
percent relief in certain situations.'' 9 Under Canadian law, 20 the government
may impose a compulsory license on the patent holder and have generic
manufacturers produce the drug, but adequate remuneration must be paid to the
patent holder to account for the economic loss.'2 '
109. Id. This would bring China into compliance with article 31(f) and (h).
110. Id.
11l. Id.
112. Bernard D'Mello, Transnational Pharmaceutical Corporations and Neo-Liberal Business Ethics
in India, 36 J. OF Bus. ETHICS 165 (2002).
113. Id.
114. Id. Additionally, India, Egypt and Pakistan are not required to adopt the medicine provisions
of the TRIPs agreement until 2005. Medicines: Commission Seeks to Square Poor Country Circle, EUR. REP.,
June 15, 2002.
115. Scott Farnsworth, Opinion: Scott Farnsworth, THE LAWYER, Apr. 8, 2002 at 17.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Patent Act, § 19(4) (1985) (Can.).
121. Shashank Upadhye, After Cipro Battle, Patent-Busting is Still Live Issue. Attempts at Generic
Versions Compulsory Licensing Issues State Infringement?, 24 NAT'L L.J. (2002).
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The United States, home to most of the research-based pharmaceutical
companies, has tried to influence countries to adopt patent laws that exceed the
minimum provisions of TRIPs and totally exclude compulsory licensing. 22
Because the United States' economy is increasingly moving away from basic
manufacturing into high-technology industries, intellectual property protection
has become much more of a concern.'23 The United States has labored to
discourage foreign governments from breaking pharmaceutical patents and
buying unauthorized generics from such countries as China and India,
recognized as the two major exporters of unauthorized generic drugs.'24 As a
deterrent, the United States has trade barriers and other various forms of
political pressure on non-compliant governments. 2 5 Critics state that the United
States argument that the TRIPs agreement allows it to prevent developing
countries from addressing national health emergencies through the use of
parallel importing and compulsory licensing by the imposition of trade
sanctions, undermines the political foundations of the WTO itself. 26 They
claim that such steps poison the environment in which negotiations are
undertaken, agreements are carried out, and disputes are settled.'27
A current House bill'28 will permit generic companies to force a
compulsory license from brand-name companies. Under the Affordable
Prescription Drug Act, the brand-name drug manufacturer would be forced to
license a generic equivalent.'29 The generic drug company would be required
to pay a reasonable royalty to the brand-name company and civil penalties
would result from failure to do so. 130
V. CHALLENGING THE CIPRO PATENT
Bayer AG, a German corporation, owns the 4,670,444 patent (the 444
patent) on the main ingredient of Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) until
2003, and the 5,286,754 patent (the 754 patent) covering the pharmaceutical
formulation of the main ingredient until 2011.'' In 1997, Bayer settled a patent
infringement case in which Barr Labs alleged that Bayer's patents were no
122. Harrelson, supra note 1, at 176.
123. Id.
124. Godwin, supra note 83.
125. Id.
126. Abbot, supra note 27, at 85.
127. Id.
128. House Report HR 1708.
129. Upadhye, supra note 121.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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longer valid over prior art. 32 Part of the settlement included Bayer paying Barr
fifty million dollars a year not to produce a generic equivalent to Cipro.'33
Bayer instituted a reexamination of the patent and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) maintained the validity of the patent. 134 Other generic
companies sued under the same theory, but the District Court of New Jersey
ruled in favor of Bayer and dismissed the invalidity actions. 135 Many other
generic manufacturers have filed for certification of each patent once the
originals expire. 1
36
Cipro was the first drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for treatment of anthrax infections, but the last case of anthrax infection
occurred in the 1970's. 137 Cipro's major anthrax testing occurred more than ten
years ago by the United States Army biowarfare researchers on rhesus
monkeys. 138 The Persian Gulf War proved beneficial to Bayer, as Cipro was
rushed through the FDA approval amongst fears that Saddam Hussein might use
anthrax as a biological weapon. 139 This quick approval was due to Cipro's
advantages over other antibiotics. 140 It is not a part of the same family of drugs
as penicillin or tetracycline, which means that it would remain an effective
antidote against strains of anthrax resistant to penicillin or tetracycline."" Cipro
is the best selling antibiotic in the world and has been since 1991, and in 1999
Bayer's gross sales of Cipro totaled 1.04 billion dollars.'42
132. Id. See In Re Ciprofloxacin HydroChloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D.N.Y.
2001). Barr first applied for a generic version of Cipro in 1991 and received tentative approval for the generic
version in 1995. But by 1997, Barr, along with two other companies, Rugby and Hoechst-Marion Roussel,
had come to an agreement whereby Bayer would pay the companies over $200 million in exchange for the
company's promise not to produce generic versions of Cipro. Consumer Group Challenges Cipro Pact, 9 No.
6 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 9 (2001).
133. Id. It was a consumer advocacy group that sued to dislodge the agreement between Bayer and
other drug manufacturers that prohibited any generic versions of Cipro to be made. The Prescription Access
Litigation project is a group of more than sixty organizations from over twenty-nine states that challenged the
agreement. Unlike other challenges in the court at that time, the suit was only seeking injunctive relief,
whereas the others where seeking monetary damages. Nick Dutton, The Price You Pay for Their Patent
Protection, GLASS AGE, Jan. 31, 2002.
134. Upadhye, supra note 121.
135. See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 705 (NJ 2001); Meyers v. Bayer
AG, 143 F.Supp.2d 1044 (E.D. Wisc 2001).
136. Upadhye, supra note 121.
137. Godwin, supra note 83.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Consumer Group Challenges Cipro Pact, 9 No. 6 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 9 (2001).
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The United States Code'43 holds that the government has the authority to
infringe on patents.' 44 Under this section, the government need not negotiate the
patent's use with the owner. 45 The government, or its agents, would have to
pay some compensation to the owner, and the government's use cannot be
enjoined. 46  The royalty the government has used is based on an eminent
domain theory of recovery and is measured by what the patentee has lost rather
than what the government has gained. "'
VI. UNITED STATES ANTHRAX SCARE FURTHER THREATENS BAYER AG
Tommy Thompson was the United States Secretary of Health and Human
Services at the time of the recent anthrax scare and as such, he was responsible
for the health of every American. When problems arise he has the power to
require immunizations and quarantines and order the distribution of medicine.1
48
Traditionally, the courts defer to the judgment of the Secretary."' He also
controls governmental spending in areas of scientific research, as well as having
the duty to pass on information discovered by the government to the
pharmaceutical companies. 50 Above it all, his main objective is to protect the
lives of American citizens."
Following the anthrax scares that occurred in October 2001, and in
response to concerns over an inadequate supply of Cipro doses, Thompson's
first statement was that the government lacked the statutory authority to grant
itself a compulsory license for the generic production of Cipro. 52 It was James
Love and Ralph Nader that co-authored a public letter to the Secretary declaring
that Title 28, Section 1498, of the United States Code was more than sufficient
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
144. See also Crater Corp. v. Lucent Tech., 255 F.3d 1361 (Cir. 2001). Where it was held that 14
U.S.C. § 1498 provides for such authority.
145. Godwin, supra note 83.
146. Id. The government has even required compulsory licensing for the military on such things as
satellite technology and night-vision glasses, using public interest as the main argument. Harrelson, supra
note 1.
147. Id. This is refuted by the pharmaceutical industry as the correct reading of the law. The
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers Association of America (PhRMA) believes that section refers
to "eminent domain" compensation, and that the United States has a greater obligation under the WTO and
the TRIPs agreement to work with the drug manufacturer first. Id.
148. Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma --- In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson Distorted
Patent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002.
149. See Bowen v. Mi. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Furlong v. Shalala, 238 F.
3d 227 (2nd Cir. 2001); Diagnostic Cardioline Monitoring of N.Y., Inc., v. Shalala, No. 99-CV-5686 (JS),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13443, at I (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
150. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
151. Id.
152. Godwin, supra note 83.
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law to permit the production of generic drugs. 153 In 1918, a law was passed that
gave the government the ability to guarantee that its shipbuilding orders would
not be hindered by patent litigation. 154 This law was the authority for Senator
Charles Schumer's suggestion that Secretary Thompson allow other drug
manufacturers to produce Cipro during the anthrax crisis.' Schumer said that
the generic versions of Cipro would both reduce the reliance on a sole supplier
and could significantly reduce costs. 156 At first, Thompson was concerned about
the delicate balance between patent protection and the concern for adequate
Cipro supply. 157 He made a statement with regard to this balance, knowing that
a month later the WTO would be having a meeting to discuss whether nations
have the right to disregard patents to address public health concerns. 1
58
But there is another law that controls FDA decisions concerning generic
drugs, which would prevent the government from buying generic Cipro because
it had not first passed final FDA approval."' Under the 1984 Hatch-Waxman
Act, companies cannot produce generic versions of drugs for thirty months if
the patent is not expired and the patent holder opposes the production of generic
versions of its drug. 16  These conflicting laws created a very difficult position
for Secretary Thompson to be in.
161
It was on October 18, 2001, that the Canadian Minister of Health signed
a contract with other pharmaceutical manufacturers for the production of
Cipro. 162  His reasoning was for the sufficiency of Canada's stockpile and
Bayer's ability to provide an adequate supply.163 Canada's position was that if
Bayer could not produce, then Health Canada, the national health care system,
would be forced to use its supply of generic equivalents.' 14 The next day,
153. Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).
154. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148. See The Act ofJune 25, 1910, c. 423,36 Stat. 851, as amended
by The Act of July 1, 1918, c. 114, 40 Stat. 704. See also William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co.
v. Int'l Curtis Marine Turbing Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
155. Id. Simply put, the law said that the federal government could take license for itself, so long
as the patent holder was provided with adequate compensation. Id.
156. Lawrence B. Ebert, Where Have You Gone, Richard K. Lyon?, INTELLPROPTODAY, Dec. 2001.
157. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
161. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Ebert, supra note 156. Canada's Health Minister commissioned a generic manufacturer to
produce a million doses of Cipro even as Bayer assured that it could supply Canada's needs. Upadhye, supra
note 121. As well, there had been no anthrax outbreaks in Canada. Id. It was questionable whether Canada's
action was "necessary to protect public health," as required under Article 8(1) of the TRIPs agreement. Id.
It seemed that the Health Canada official who ordered the generic Cipro did not get prior approval from the
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Thompson started threatening Bayer by saying that he would have laws changed
so that he could break the Cipro patent.165 Soon after, Canada brokered a deal
with Bayer to purchase Cipro at a significantly reduced price; this allowed
Thompson to do the same, effectively saving the country eighty-two million
dollars, as well as preventing certain future litigation.'66 Thompson later stated
at a Congressional hearing that the issue was price and not the supply.
67
The pharmaceutical industry believed that even if Bayer was unable to
meet the demand for Cipro at that time, the best decision was to still contract
with Bayer.'68 Bayer could then meet the new demand by licensing the Cipro
to other manufacturers, allowing Bayer to maintain its long-term value.
169
Bayer could set the prices of the private transactions and still meet the demands
of the government during a public health crisis. 70
Politicians and the media were greatly concerned over the possibility of
"busting" Bayer's patent on Cipro so that an alleged shortage of the drug could
be supplied."' In a traditional drug patent-busting lawsuit, a generic drug
company will file with the FDA an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
on the drug, claiming that its generic version is basically the same as the brand-
name drug. 172  This could have been a possibility for breaking the Cipro
patent. 173 Normally, if the generic version is the same, then the ANDA will be
approved and a generic equivalent will enter the market. 17' The most common
type of application is a Paragraph IV ANDA certification, which says that the
applicant seeks immediate permanent approval because either the generic will
not infringe, or the patent is invalid.'75 Under United States law, 7 6 a brand-
Patent Commissioner of the Ministry of Industry. Id. Godwin, supra note 83. Additionally, no national
emergency had been declared. Godwin, supra note 83. It was an Indian company that offered to sell the
generic Cipro at one-twentieth the cost. Gollin, supra note 77.
165. Fleischer-Black, supra note 148.
166. Id.
167. Ebert, supra note 156.
168. Godwin, supra note 83.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Upadhye, supra note 121.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. There are also Paragraph I, fl, and III ANDA certifications. Paragraph I certification said
that the drug had not been patented. Paragraph 11 certification meant that the patent had expired. Paragraph
M certification meant that the date on which the generic equivalent will go on the market will be after the date
which the patent will expire. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, available at http://www.oblon.com/Pub/seeker.php3?hatchwax.html (last
visited on July 15, 2002).
176. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 271(e)(2)(A)(B).
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name drug manufacturer can sue a generic drug company that files a Paragraph
IV ANDA certification.177
The Bayer chief executive stated that Bayer would not give Cipro away to
the United States because if it had done so, then it would have to give it away
to all the other countries sharing the United States ideals, because they would
be threatened as well. 17 Seven other antibiotics were offered for free from their
manufacturers, including Bristol-Meyers Squibb's Tequin and Johnson &
Johnson's Levaquin, which are in the same family as Cipro, but have yet to be
approved for use against anthrax. 7 9 The two companies stated that they each
would donate 100 million tablets to the United States if they could receive
automatic approval for use against anthrax. 180
When Secretary Thompson threatened to override the Cipro patent, he
claimed that this was in compliance with the TRIPs agreement.' 8' If the United
States government had used Article 31 of the TRIPs agreement to grant
compulsory licenses for the eighteen cases of anthrax, then poorer countries
would use that decision to extort compulsory licenses of the AIDS cocktail
drugs to treat the millions of cases of AIDS. "'82 The economy of drug licensing
would be disrupted, as research and development profits are returned to the
companies through sales in developed countries. 183 The developed countries
help to offset lower prices in poorer countries, but profits are lost when
compulsory licenses are used as a threat by developed countries seeking to
reduce the prices of drugs to generic levels. 184
VHI. DOHA DECLARATION AND THE FUTURE
On November 14, 2001, the WTO members met in Doha, Qatar for a
ministerial conference to discuss specifically international intellectual property
rights under the TRIPs agreement. The Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed that
each WTO member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other extreme urgency, as required under the TRIPs agreement
before a compulsory license can be granted.' 85 Paragraph 1 of the Declaration
177. Upadhye, supra note 121.
178. Bayer's Reasons for not Giving Cipro Away; USA Slammed for "Double Standards,"
MARKETLETER, Nov. 12, 2001 [hereinafter Bayer's reasons]. Bayer did donate eight million Cipro tablets
to the front-line workers involved in the anthrax crisis.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Bayer's reasons, supra note 178.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Ministerial Conference, Nov. 14, 2001, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION [hereinafter
Ministerial Declaration].
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specifically lists AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis and malaria.'86 Although the
Declaration does not define a public health crisis, the examples provided help
to narrow the scope. Paragraph 4 states that the TRIPs agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 87
Paragraph 5(b) states that each member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted.'88 This provides a presumption of validity to a WTO member
determining that a national health emergency exists. 189 Additionally, this
represents a shift of "balance of rights and obligations" away from the patent
owner. 90  Under threat of compulsory licensing, a patent holder will be
persuaded easier by a WTO member to conclude a licensing agreement. 191
Both health activists and the pharmaceutical industry see the Declaration
as a victory.' 92 The Declaration drew on drafts provided by two opposite sides
of the issue: one from developed nations, and the other from sixty developing
nations.' 93 The first side recognized that intellectual property protection is
important for the development of new medicines.' 4 The second side relied
more on the TRIPs agreement's effect on drug prices, saying that it should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. 95 The final
version stated that compulsory licensing need not be restricted to pandemics, as
the United States-led draft suggested.' 96 The compromise reached recognized
the problem that countries having little or no manufacturing ability would not
be able to make effective use of compulsory licensing. 97 Activists and
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 4.
188. Id. at 5(b).
189. Nolff, supra note 24, at 144.
190. Id., at 145.
191. Id.
192. Kevin Gopal, New Accord: A WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement Affirms Countries'
Right to Protect Public Health Through Access to Medicines for All, PHARM EXEC., Jan. 1, 2002 [hereinafter
New Accord].
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Dubey Muchkund, Inplications of Dohafor India - H, THE HINDU, Dec. 25, 2001. India played
a major role in creating a degree of unity and cohesion between the developing countries and had wanted to
include in the declaration a provision allowing parallel importation of drugs from other developing countries,
but this was not accepted. ld.; India's National Working Group on Patents felt that the Declaration had not
diluted the TRIPs agreement in favor of the least-developed countries in any way. Currently, most of India's
22,000 drug companies are small local pharmaceutical manufacturers, and TRIPs compliance will force
between 50-75 percent of them out of business by the year 2015. It is estimated that by 2025, only 200-250
will remain. Indian Pharma's Mixed Views on Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health,
MARKETLETTER, Dec. 10, 2001.
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developing nations said that the Declaration clarified the interpretations of the
ambivalent agreement.'98
Within the context of the Ministerial Declaration, in order to grant a
compulsory license in times of public health emergencies, it is required that the
license is necessary to protect public health and address a public health crisis,
authorization of the license must be considered on its individual merits, and the
right holder must be notified.'99 The scope and duration must be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized, and must be liable to be terminated if and
when the circumstances, which led to it, cease to exist and are unlikely to
recur.200 Underdeveloped countries and private sector advocates see the new
declaration as a way out of the AIDS crisis and other health emergencies, but
they still realize that it is a battle of lives versus money.2'
The Ministers did oppose a proposal recommended by the developing
countries that countries without manufacturing ability could import medicines
made under compulsory licenses in another country.20 2 This creates the situation
where many developing countries cannot make use of compulsory licenses.2°3
They do not have manufacturing ability, which is a requirement for granting a
compulsory license.2 °n It is estimated that only ten of the one hundred thirty
developing members of the WTO can use compulsory licenses to manufacture
their own drugs. 2 5  Article 31(f) of the TRIPs agreement imposes the
requirement that production under compulsory licenses must be predominately
for the domestic market.206 One of the options proposed to deal with the
developing countries with little or no domestic manufacturing ability is to
remove the requirement completely from Article 3 1(f), but this was not done.20 7
Another option was to interpret Article 30 of the agreement to mean that
products made under compulsory licenses can be exported to developing
countries facing public health problems that lack the domestic production
capacity. 2°1
The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Commission of European
Communities welcomed the Doha Declaration and the pro-public health
198. New Accord, supra note 192.
199. Nolff, supra note 24, at 143.
200. Id. at 141.
201. Kolker, supra note 13.
202. New Accord, supra note 192.
203. Campaigners Urge Action on Poor Countries' Access to Cheaper Drugs, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 28, 2002.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. TRIPS Meeting Examines Drug Licensing Hitches, BUS. LINE, Mar. 14, 2002; See also TRIPs
article 31 (f).
207. Id.
208. Id.; See also TRPs article 30.
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approach it had. 2 9 The WHO and the European Commission (EU) have agreed
to work closely with the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) on technical assistance to developing countries implementing the TRIPs
agreement, believing that global cooperation is required so that generic
manufacturers can provide the lowest prices on a sustainable basis to the poorest
countries. 2 ' The European Commission is proposing an exception to the TRIPs
agreement that allows WTO members to export generic drugs produced under
compulsory licenses to developing countries without quantitative limits, so that
countries without production capability can rely on other countries for its
Supply.21' The European Union even proposed an option amending the TRIPs
agreement to include for the export of medicines to poorer countries. 2 2 The EU
is also proposing a global tiered pricing system for certain pharmaceutical
products in the poorest countries.1 3 Tiered pricing is used in some countries,
but the push is to use it for all developing countries. z 4
The TRIPs agreement was not altered or amended, but the Declaration
merely acted as a suggestion for how to interpret the agreement.2 5 Medicines
are treated as any other commodity, but the declaration says that since they save
lives, their patents should have different standards applied.2 16 Drug companies
rely on the fact that the agreement was not amended and, therefore, the
agreement still stands as it did before." 7 Drug companies do hold the upper
hand because they can stop the research into new drugs when they lose
confidence on the payoffs.2"8
The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(IFPMA) pointed out that the Declaration was political rather than a legal or
binding instrument, but did agree that the final version reflected the balanced
interest to encourage innovation in drug therapies and vaccines, while seeking
to promote improved access to medicines. 2 9 The European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) said that it welcomed the
Declaration's confirmation that the TRIPs agreement was flexible enough to
209. Commission and WHO Join Forces to Tackle Health Threats, RAPID, June 6, 2002.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Tectonic Shift, supra note 70.
214. Id.
215. Kolker, supra note 13.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Pharma Industry View's WTO 's "Political" Doha Declaration on TRIPS, MARKETLETrER, Nov.
26, 2001 [hereinafter Pharma industry].
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take account of public health concerns and that intellectual property protection
is vital for the development of new medicines.22°
The United States position opposing an easing of TRIPs had been
undermined by Washington's threat, just before the meeting, to break Bayer's
patent on Cipro, unless the drug company lowered the price. 22' The
international community felt that this represented a double standard by the
United States.222 The United States had previously received criticism for calling
on the WTO to rule that Brazil's legal requirement that patent holders must
produce patented products in the country, rather than have them imported, was
in violation of WTO.223 Brazil was in fact, given much credit for brokering the
Declaration and this gave Brazil more assurance to confront the abusive pricing
of brand-name drugs.224
The United States is also trying to limit the countries that could benefit
from the production-for-export exception. 225 The United States wishes to limit
the applicability of the rule to small market countries for fear that small rich
countries will benefit.226 This will affect many small African countries that are
considered small market because they have small populations and have a low
number of people that can afford the drugs.227 In reference to AIDS and other
diseases of poverty, the production-for-export exception may be the only way
to get these countries affordable medicines, for they do not have their own
production capacity.228 The United States is also trying to exclude the larger
developing and middle-income countries because they are considered an area
of future growth for the patent pharmaceutical industry.229 By limiting the
conditions, which would warrant a compulsory license to only "serious" health
conditions, the other much needed medicines, such as expensive antibiotics and
diabetes medicines, are excluded.230 The main concern over the exception in the
United States is that the "production-for-export" medicines will find their way
back into the United States and be sold on the American market.23'
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Pharma Industry, supra note 219.
225. Pan-Africa, supra note 52.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Some even believe that the exception would even benefit the United States and EU countries
in cases of orphan diseases. These diseases have small incidence and require orphan drugs at exorbitant
prices. Additionally, this could be used for bioterrorism or epidemic outbreaks in developed countries to
import the drugs needed. Id.
229. Id.
230. Pan-Africa, supra note 52.
231. Id.
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It is important to provide access to affordable medicines both through the
public and private sectors.232 First, existing workplace clinics of larger
employers provide considerable capacity to the private sector through benefits
to employees.233 Since ARV medicines have not been reduced in price in the
private sector, employers are refusing to supply them to employees. 4 Second,
medical aid plans that extend to both the private and public sectors have benefit
limits that make it impossible to pay for ARV medicines unless they have been
heavily discounted. 235  Third, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and
mission hospitals, which are included in the private sector, have in place the
ability to deliver high quality treatment and care, but only if the drugs are made
more affordable.236
The shift of balance of rights and obligations, created by the Declaration,
away from the patent owner has already resulted in more favorable agreement
for purchases of pharmaceuticals by governments than might have been
possible.237 Possibly the biggest impact of the Ministerial Declaration is that the
threat of a compulsory license will make it easier for a WTO member to
persuade a patent holder to concede a licensing agreement. 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The need for affordable drugs in developing countries due to the AIDS
crisis has further defined the contrast between these countries and the developed
nations such as the United States. Although the United States does have an
AIDS problem, it does not see the same high percentage of infections as do the
lower income less-developed countries. Developing countries that do have high
infectious rates may see this as a lack of compassion by the United States for the
crises affecting their countries.
The United States, through a concern for returned investments of large
corporations, may have lost sight into what the founding fathers based the
country on: the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. AIDS
in America is still seen mostly as a disease among homosexuals and, therefore,
the government may be more concerned with profits rather than human lives,
but the countries in Africa and South America do not have the same ideals.
They are using whatever means they have to get free medicines to the millions
of their citizens afflicted with a disease that will surely end their life and any
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Pan-Africa, supra note 52.
236. Id.
237. Nolff, supra note 24, at 145.
238. Id.
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chance at happiness. The irony found behind the anthrax attacks and the United
States' reaction to them is that Americans now have a fear that they never had
before; whereas developing countries facing the AIDS crises may have more
hope for the future than ever before.
